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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

ROSEMARY WISCOMBE,
Plaintiff/Respondent,
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
vs.

]

J. WILLIAM WISCOMBE

)

Case No. 2033

Defendant/Appellant.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
Did the District Court, J. Dennis Frederick presiding,

(1)

Commit reversible error in adopting the recomend

ations of Domestic Relations Commissioner (with modifications)
without permitting defendant/appellant an evidentiary hearing in
this matter?
(2)

Are the adopted recommendations erroneous in any

event?
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is a post-judgment proceeding pursuant to an Order
to Show Cause following a Divorce Decree seeking to reduce to
judgment alleged "mortgage payments" claimed by plaintiff to be
owing to her by defendant pursuant to the Decree of Divorce.
(R.131-135)

The matter was presented to Commissioner Sandra

Peuler, Domestic Relations Commissioner for the Third District

Court, on August 9, 1984, and reduced by her to a recommendation
in writing in a Minute Entry (R.137)(Addendum, page 22) on which
she wrote, among other things, "Deft did not accept
recommendation."

As indicated in the transcript of that hearing

(R.230-242), the matter was submitted to Commissioner Peuler on
proffers from respective counsel as is usually the case in her
courtroom.

No actual evidence was adduced, admitted or permitted.
On October 1, 1984, the matter came before District

Court Judge J. Dennis Frederick, who ruled that the defendant
must be deemed to have consented to the entry of an order in
conformance with the Commissioner's recommendation because
defendant had failed to comply with Judge Frederick's interpretation of Rule 8(d) of the local Rules of the District Court.
(R.148)

In the Order (Addendum, page 26) just noted, Judge

Frederick also reduced the alleged mortgage payments to a dollar
certain amount and entered judgment in the sum of $8,411, together
with interest, even though he permitted no evidence to be adduced
at the hearing on October 1 as to liability or amount claimed, and
although Commissioner Peuler had made no finding on the amount
owing (if any) in her recommendation or in the transcript
hearing above referred to.

of the

Plaintiff's entitlement to, and the

amount of any such judgment are both contested issues in this
proceeding.
In addition, Judge Frederick awarded a $150 attorney's
fee to the plaintiff for the benefit of her attorney even though,
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as noted above, no evidentiary basis for such award occurred
before Judge Frederick, nor was there any recommendation for
an attorney's fee in Commissioner Peuler's Minute Entry.
Defendant filed timely objections to the judgment of
the District Court (R.151-155) which were argued before Judge
Frederick on November 19, 1984, and an Order Denying the
Objections was entered by the Court November 20, 1984, (R163)(Addendum, page 29) from which the defendant timely prosecuted
this appeal.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellant/defendant will be referred to hereinafter
as "defendant," and respondent/plaintiff will be referred to
hereinafter as "plaintiff."
A Decree of Divorce was entered in the above-entitled
matter June 23, 1981, in which the plaintiff was awarded the
parties1 residence at 4612 Belmour Way, Salt Lake City, Utah,
which was encumbered by two mortgages.

Defendant was awarded two

rental properties located respectively at 195 Allen Street,
Midvale, Utah, and 1201 Sage, Evanston, Wyoming, each of which was
also heavily mortgaged. (R.115-120)
Paragraph 3 of the Decree provides:
"Plaintiff is hereby awarded the residence of the
parties at 4612 Belmour Way, Salt Lake City, Utah. The
first mortgage on said residence property with Deseret
Federal Savings and Loan, having a balance of
approximately Fifty-two thousand eight hundred dollars,
($52,800.00), and monthly payments of approximately Five
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hundred seventy-eight dollars, ($578.00), shall be paid
by defendant. The second mortgage on said residence
with Deseret Federal Savings and Loan, having an
approximate balance of Fourteen thousand dollars
($14,000.00), and monthly payments of approximately One
hundred eighty-one dollars ($181.00), shall be paid by
plaintiff."
Paragraph 4 continues:
"Defendant is hereby awarded the rental properties
of the parties at 195 Allen Street, Midvale, Utah, and
1201 Sage, Evanston, Wyoming, subject to and contingent
upon plaintiff being relieved of all obligations for
payment of any loans secured by said rental properties,
provided that defendant shall execute and deliver to
plaintiff a mortgage or trust deed for the benefit of
plaintiff in such amount as shall be required to pay the
first mortgage on the plaintiff's residence, together
with all costs and attorneys fees to be incurred in
recovering the amounts owing and in paying the balance
owed on the first mortgage on plaintiff's residence.
Said mortgage or trust deed shall be against the rental
properties at 1201 Sage, Evanston, Wyoming."
On June 30, 1982, plaintiff sold the family home on a
Uniform Real Estate Contract, having previously moved to St.
George, Utah, with the minor children of the parties.

(See

"Notice of Existing Uniform Real Estate Contract" recorded in the
office of the Salt Lake County Recorder June 29, 1982, with the
contract attached thereto dated June 30, 1982, in the Addendum to
this Brief, pages 12 to 15.)

Plaintiff remarried on May 18, 1983,

prior to any alleged delinquency in the said mortgage payments.
(Answers to Interrogatories, Addendum to this Brief, page 7).
Thereafter on August 9, 1984, the plaintiff brought an
Order to Show Cause proceeding (Addendum, page 17) before Third
District Court Domestic Relations Commissioner Sandra Peuler
dealing with the first mortgage on the home referred to above.
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At

that hearing before Commissioner Peuler each side made proffers,
but no evidence was permitted or received.

At the conclusion of

the hearing, Commissioner Peuler made a recommendation as set
forth on Exhibit A to Commissioner Peulerfs Affidavit annexed to
defendant's Motion for Summary Disposition filed with this court
November 14, 1984, and reproduced in the Addendum to this Brief at
page 11. At the same time that the decision was announced, the
defendant's counsel stated into the record in open court that
defendant did not accept the said decision, and that objection was
duly noted on the said Minute Entry by Commissioner Peuler.
(R.137)(Addendum, page 11)

In preparation for an evidentiary

hearing before Judge Frederick, the defendant thereafter on August
14, 1984, served Interrogatories upon the plaintiff for the
purpose of ascertaining the facts and circumstances surrounding
the sale of the home of the parties and the disposition of the
mortgage on said home, the payment of which was the subject of
plaintiff's Order to Show Cause.
The said Interrogatories were answered by plaintiff
without objection on or about September 10, 1984. A copy of those
Answers to Interrogatories is included in the Addendum to this
Brief at pages 3 to 8.

(Certificate of Service of Interrogatories

is at page 21 and Certificate of Service of Answers to Interrogatories is at page 25 of the Addendum.)
Thereafter counsel for defendant sent a notice to
counsel for plaintiff which stated:
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"TO THE PLAINTIFF AND HER ATTORNEY, AARON ALMA NELSON:
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the Order to Show Cause
heard by Commissioner Sandra Peuler on August 9, 1984f
has been referred to the Honorable J. Dennis Frederick,
judge of the above-entitled court, and is set for
hearing on Monday, September 10, 1984, at the hour of
9:00 a.m.
DATED the 21st day of August, 1984.
/s/
GORDON A. MADSEN
Attorney for Defendant"
(R.138 and Addendum Page 23)
The matter was actually heard by Judge Frederick on
October 1, 1984, at which time plaintiff's attorney made a motion
that Judge Frederick adopt the Commissioner's findings and to
disallow defendant an evidentiary hearing on the merits for the
purported reason that defendant had not complied with Rule 8(d) of
the Rules of Procedure in the Third District Court.

This is the

first time such an issue had ever been raised, plaintiff's counsel
having answered the said Interrogatories without objection after
the hearing before Commissioner Peuler.

Defendant resisted said

motion, but the Court granted the motion of the plaintiff to
disallow defendant a hearing on the merits and granted plaintiff's
motion to adopt the findings of the Commissioner without hearing.
Consequently no evidentiary hearing was conducted by Judge
Frederick then or at any time.

Written Judgment was entered

October 19, 1984.
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(R.147-150)
Reference to additional facts located in the record will
be made in the course of argument.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
POINT I.

Defendant complied with Rule 8(d) of the Rules

of the Third Judicial District Court:

Rule 8(d) provides that if

a party is not satisfied with a recommendation by the
Commissioner, that he give notice to the Commissioner and opposing
counsel within five days that the recommendation is rejected.
rule does not require such notice to be in writing.

The

Counsel for

defendant notified the Commissioner and opposing counsel in open
court that the recommendation of the Commissioner was rejected,
and that rejection was noted in the Commissioner's own Memorandum
Decision.

Furthermore, counsel for plaintiff thereafter answered

Interrogatories served by counsel for the defendantf showing that
he had fully understood that the Commissioner's recommendation had
been rejected and that a hearing before the judge was required.
POINT II.

Plaintiff's counsel had actual or

constructive notice, or both, of defendant's refusal to accept
Commissioner Peuler's recommendation:

Within five days of the

hearing by Commissioner Peuler, counsel for defendant served
Interrogatories upon counsel for the plaintiff.

The only purpose

for such Interrogatories could be that counsel for defendant had
rejected the Commissioner's recommendation, and the
Interrogatories themselves constituted actual, constructive or
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implied notice of rejection, which, in keeping with liberal
construction of the rules (Rule 1, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure),
fulfill any notice requirements in any event.
POINT III.

At the initial hearing Commissioner Peuler

herself stated that if there were appropriate evidence that
plaintiff was no longer bound on the mortgage in question, she
might be persuaded to rule otherwise, and in the same ruling from
the bench Commissioner Peuler herself noted that a further
evidentiary hearing appeared to be necessary in this matter:
Commissioner Peuler stated that she might well be persuaded to
reverse her ruling if

plaintiff had relieved herself of the

mortgage obligation (which in fact turned out to be the case, but
which counsel for plaintiff did not admit in his proffer before
Commissioner Peuler), and Commissioner Peuler actually stated that
she herself thought that a further evidentiary hearing would be
required.
POINT IV.

Judge Frederick's order miscontrued Rule 8(d)

and its implementation by Commissioner Peuler as reflected in her
Affidavit:

At the hearing before Judge Frederick, counsel for the

plaintiff informed the Court that Rule 8 required that the
rejection be in writing.

Judge Frederick apparently accepted that

representation, although Rule 8(d) does not make any requirement
as to a written rejection, and the notation in Commissioner
Peulerfs Minute Entry would in any event satisfy any requirement
for a written rejection.

Finally, counsel for plaintiff has
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nowhere asserted that he was in anywise prejudiced by the form of
the rejection.
POINT V.

Judge Frederick's Judgment without allowing an

evidentiary hearing exceeds and modifies the recommendation of
Commissioner Peuler:

At the hearing before Judge Frederick he

denied defendant evidentiary hearing and stated that he was
adopting the Commissioner's recommendation.

Nevertheless, he went

beyond the Commissioner's recommendation in determining without
evidence the amount of the debt owed and also in awarding an
attorney's fee.

He further went on to require that defendant give

plaintiff a mortgage to secure the very debt which plaintiff had
relieved herself of and upon which subject Commissioner Peuler
declined to make any ruling on the basis that there was not
sufficient evidence before her to do so.
POINT VI.

There is, even in the abbreviated record

before this court, sufficient factual material that would suggest
that the opposite result would have been reached by the District
Court had there been an evidentiary hearing and requires, at the
very least, that in fairness and equity an evidentiary hearing
should be ordered by this Court:

Defendant is entitled in equity

and good conscience to an evidentiary hearing upon the facts of
this case.
POINT VII.

The recommendations of Commissioner Peuler

as adopted by Judge Frederick are erroneous in any event:

The

Order that defendant make monthly intallment payments to the
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holder of the first mortgage on the residence awarded to the
plaintiff would appear to be in the nature of support to plaintiff
and was accordingly an award in the nature of alimony, which award
would terminate as soon as plaintiff was relieved from payment of
the debt and a third party had assumed itf or in any event would
terminate upon the remarriage of the plaintiff, which remarriage
occurred prior to the accrual of any of the arrears claimed by the
plaintiff.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.

DEFENDANT COMPLIED WITH RULE 8(d) OF THE RULES

OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT.
Rule 8(d) of the Rules of Procedure of the Third
Judicial District Court provides:
"Any party objecting to the recommended order or
seeking further hearing before the assigned judge shall,
within five (5) days of entry of the commissioner's
recommendations, provide notice to the commissioner's
office and opposing counsel that the recommended order
is not acceptable or that further hearing is desired.
The commissioner shall then refer the matter to the
assigned judge for further hearing, conference or trial.
If no objection or request for further hearing is made
within five (5) days, said party shall be deemed to have
consented to entry of an order in conformance with the
commissioner's recommendation."
(The entire text of Rules 6 through 10 of the Rules of Procedure
of the Third District Court are included in the Addendum to this
Brief at pages 1 and 2.)
The aforesaid affidavit of Commissioner Peuler submitted
to this Court and reproduced in the Addendum, pages 9 to 11, says:
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"That the usage in her courtroom, both before and since
the adoption of the Rules of Procedure for the Third
District Court, and particularly as it relates to Rule
8(d), was and is that if a party in a domestic relations
matter did not agree or concur with said commissioner's
recommended order, the party could so inform the court
at the time; or should such party wish additional time
for deliberation before deciding, could do so at any
time within five (5) days from the date of the hearing.
Such notice or communication of disagreement or
nonconcurrence has never been required by Commissioner
Peuler to be submitted in writing. Frequently the
nonconcurrence was announced in open court at the time
the recommended order was announced, in which case such
nonconcurrence would be noted in the minute entry for
that date. Such a disagreement or nonconcurrence on the
part of the defendant in the case of Wiscombe v.
Wiscombe was made by counsel in open court and so noted
on Commissioner Peulerfs minute entry in that matter
dated August 9, 1984." (Emphasis added.)(Addendum, pages
9 and 10)
That Minute Entry (R.137)(Addendum, page 11 and page 22)
says:
"1. As long as pltf is obligated on mortgage
payments, deft is obligated too.
"2. Pltf is entitled to judgments he hasn't made
on that (sic).
"3. Defendant is obligated to do what divorce
decree required him to do.
"Deft did not accept recommendation." (Emphasis
added.)
In the transcript of the hearing, which is not complete
and has several "(inaudible)" notes throughout (which, the
undersigned supposes was because it was transcribed from a tape
recording of the proceedings since there is no shorthand reporter
assigned to Commissioner Peuler), there appears the following:

-11-

Following the Commissioner's announcing of her ruling in
the matter, she asked for questions of counsel.

Plaintiff's

attorney raised a point and then the undersigned made a statement
which is terminated with an '(inaudible).' (R.240)

The court then

continued
"Counsel, I'm not going to entertain further arguments. I've heard everything you had to say and I think
the requirements of the decree need to be carried out.
"I'll ask you to discuss the recommendation with
your clients and let me know if you need a further
setting. For your information the case has been
appointed to Judge Frederick."
The undersigned then responded "Frederick?
"The Court: 'Thank you.'"

Thank you."

(R.241)

The undersigned communicated to the Commissioner his
client's unwillingness to accept her recommendation, and this was
either "inaudible," not picked up by the machine at all, or the
recording machine was prematurely turned off, or it became mixed
up with a subsequent case.

In any event, the Commissioner herself

heard that communication made in open court by defendant's counsel
and noted it in the Minute Entry quoted above.
While there was no stenographic transcription of the
hearing thereafter in front of Judge Frederick, the undersigned
assert to this Court that counsel for plaintiff in that argument
insisted that refusal to accept the Commissioner's recommendation
had to be submitted in writing within the five-day time period.
When the matter was submitted to this Court on the Motion for
Summary Disposition, plaintiff's counsel in his Objections
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abandons that position and no longer insists that it "must be in
writing," but only asserts now that somehow he was not given
actual notice of the defendant's refusal to accept the
Commissioner's recommendation.
The Peuler Affidavit makes it clear as to what her usage
was in implementing Rule 8(d); her minute entry makes it clear
that the rule was complied with by the undersigned, and she so
noted in her minute entry.

Counsel for the plaintiff cannot now

be heard to say he didn't hear it.

He is charged, in short, with

notice of what transpires in open court, and this is true whether
the transcribed incomplete and imperfect record discloses the same
or not.
Furthermore, when plaintiff's counsel thereafter, as
part of the preparation for an evidentiary hearing before Judge
Frederick, answered defendant's Interrogatories, without
objection, he clearly demonstrated that he had heard and
understood that defendant had not accepted the recommendation of
the Commissioner.

If defendant's counsel had not in open court

rejected the recommendation, why else would counsel for plaintiff
go to the unnecessary trouble of answering Interrogatories?

He

answered the Interrogatories because he clearly knew that
defendant had rejected the Commissioner's recommendation.

When

the time came for the hearing before Judge Frederick, counsel for
plaintiff argued the requirement for a written notice, which
argument was apparently convincing to Judge Frederick.
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The

argument was clearly without merit and was thereafter abandoned,
but not until it had misled Judge Frederick.

Judge Frederick made

his ruling, it would appear, based upon the lack of a written
objection which he supposed was required, not because of any lack
of oral objection.
At the hearing, counsel for plaintiff stated to Judge
Frederick that the Rules of the Third District Court required that
the rejection be in writing.

Judge Frederick did not adjourn or

take time out on the bench to read the rules, but apparently
relied on the representation of counsel for plaintiff that the
rule contained such a requirement and accordingly ruled forthwith
from the bench.
POINT II.

PLAINTIFF'S COUNSEL HAD ACTUAL OR

CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE, OR BOTH, OF DEFENDANT'S REFUSAL TO ACCEPT
COMMISSIONER PEULER'S RECOMMENDATION.
To further buttress the above argument the record
discloses that on the fifth day following the hearing before
Commissioner Peuler counsel for defendant served on counsel for
plaintiff Interrogatories (R.136) which plaintiff answered in due
course and about which more will be said hereafter.

It would seem

patent to any inquiring, objective mind that being served
Interrogatories would serve no useful purpose unless defendant did
not consent to the recommendation of the Commissioner.

If he had

indeed consented, there would be no need for discovery.
Interrogatories would have no purpose except understood in the
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context that defendant rejected the Commissioner's recommendation.
We submit that treating those Interrogatories as actual
constructive or implied notice would satisfy any requirement for
written notice within five daysf even if there were such a
requirement.

This Court has always looked to substance rather

than to form only, and we respectfully submit that there was
substantial compliance under any theory of the case.

Rule 1(a) of

the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure requires that the rules be
"liberally construed," and certainly that requirement must apply
equally to local rules or its purpose would be thwarted.
POINT III.

AT THE INITIAL HEARING COMMISSIONER PEULER

HERSELF STATED THAT IF THERE WERE APPROPRIATE EVIDENCE THAT
PLAINTIFF WAS NO LONGER BOUND ON THE MORTGAGE IN QUESTION, SHE
MIGHT BE PERSUADED TO RULE OTHERWISE, AND IN THE SAME RULING FROM
THE BENCH COMMISSIONER PEULER HERSELF STATED THAT A FURTHER
EVIDENTIARY HEARING APPEARED TO BE NECESSARY IN THIS MATTER.
In announcing her recommendation Commissioner Peuler
made two crucial statements.

The first is as follows:

"I think that perhaps if she [the plaintiff] had
sold the home outright and relieved herself of that
mortgage obligation, I might be persuaded the outcome
may be different; but it's my belief that as long as
she's obligated on those mortgage payments, that he
should continue to comply with the requirements of the
divorce decree . . . " (R.238-239)
Counsel for plaintiff, in making his statement of
proffer to the Commissioner at the outset of the hearing, had
represented as follows:
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"In 1982, the plaintiff sold the house, but it was
sold on contract, and she's still liable to the bank on
the first mortgage and second mortgage, she still has to
pay those things, and they're being paid through an
escrow agent. Also, I think if the bank ever determines
that it was sold that way, they have the right to
require the whole payment to be due on it, so she is
still liable on that and still may be required to pay
the whole thing; and furthermore she doesn't have the
money. She got a little money when she sold the house
as a down payment and she put that into a condominium in
St. George where she moved.
"Now because the defendant refused to make the
payments to her after a while, after she got the
condominium, she had to lose that condominium and she
now has absolutely nothing in the way of property."
(R.231-232) (Emphasis added)
The foregoing is something less than a full diclosure to
the Commissioner as to what the real evidence on the issue would
be, and we call this court's attention to the addendum attached to
the Uniform Real Estate Contract appearing in the Addendum to this
Brief at page 15 where it clearly states that the buyer, one Jose
N. Roco, gave the plaintiff a hold-harmless agreement beginning at
major paragraph 2 of said addendum as follows:
"It is hereby understood and agreed that a nonalienation and/or non-assumption provision is contained
in the underlying deed of trust in favor of Deseret
Federal Savings and Loan as beneficiary, and that
pursuant to the terms of said provision, the execution
of this contract by the seller may be deemed a violation
and breach. It is hereby agreed that should the lender
seek those remedies available (including acceleration of
the remaining unpaid loan balance and/or escalation of
the original loan interest rate to current interest
rates) the buyer shall have the obligation to do one of
the following:
"A. Obtain adequate refinancing or loan proceeds
sufficient to repay the remaining contract balance or
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"B. Affirmatively negotiate with Deseret Federal
Savings and Loan, to derive an acceptable increase in
interest rate."
It appears therefore that plaintiff's buyer has given
plaintiff a hold-harmless agreement and has taken over plaintiff's
obligation on said first mortgage.

It is also to be noted that

the two immediately preceding paragraphs of the same document
obligate the buyer to increase the mortgage payments at Deseret
Federal in the event of an interest rate change or an increase in
property taxes and insurance premiums (Addendum, page 15).
Moreover, in Answers to the Interrogatories filed after
the hearing in front of Commissioner Peuler the plaintiff alleged
under oath that she received $30,000 as the down payment from the
buyer of her home and that she receives $188.19 per month to apply
on her equity over and above the mortgage payments that were
assumed by the buyer (see Addendum to this Brief, pages 4 and 5).
She further responded in her Answers to Interrogatories that her
down payment on the condominium purchased in St. George was $1,000
(Addendum, page 6). That is a substantial departure from the
representations of her counsel before Commissioner Peuler.

At

least to the undersigned $30,000 is a far cry from the "a little
money," only $1,000 of which she "put into a condominium in St.
George." (Addendum, pages 4-6)
Had the undersigned been able to develop the above facts
before Commissioner Peuler, she may very well have made the
opposite recommendation.

Defendant should have been able to
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present these facts in evidence before Judge Frederick for a
ruling on the merits.

Judge Frederick never reached the merits,

having erroneously disposed of the case on a procedural matter.
The second crucial statement from the Commissioner in
connection with giving her recommendation followed a question of
plaintiff's counsel in which he attempted to ask the Court to
impress a mortgage on the rental unit in Evanston awarded by the
Decree to the defendant, to which the Commissioner responded that
since she didn't know what the liabilities on that rental unit
were at the time of the Decree, nor what was due and owing on it
as of the time of the hearing in front of her, she didn't know
that she could comply with that request.
agreed.

Counsel for plaintiff

Then Commissioner Peuler said:

"And I think—well, what I was going to say, is
that I think it is going to take some further action
before the court can make a determination."
To which counsel for plaintiff agreed by responding:
"I think you are right." (R.240)
The only reasonable conclusion to be reached from that
exchange is that the Commissioner viewed this matter as one that
was going to need an evidentiary hearing and that further
testimony and facts had to be developed, which is only consistent
with the position of the defendant that the Commissioner and all
others in open court had been told that the Commissioner's
recommendation had been rejected

by the defendant and that
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further proceedings, evidentiary in nature, would have to be had
before Judge Frederick,
POINT IV.

JUDGE FREDERICK'S ORDER MISCONSTRUED RULE

8(d) AND ITS IMPLEMENTATION BY COMMISSIONER PEULER AS REFLECTED IN
HER AFFIDAVIT.
While Judge Frederick's initial judgment following the
hearing on October 1, 1984, was entered without the benefit of the
Affidavit from Commissioner Peuler, the clear language of Rule
8(d) as quoted above contains nothing in it requiring that
objections or nonconcurrence with the Commissioner's
recommendation be in writing, which appears to be the basis on
which the Court below entered its judgment.

That would appear to

be dispositive of that issue.
The clear written entry in the Minute Entry would
fulfill any requirement of a rejection in writing in any event.
Acts done in open court by way of stipulation, admission or other
representations by counsel on behalf of clients are binding on
counsel and the client independent of any written embodiment of
the same, and that has been the case in this state for as long as
the undersigned have been practicing law.

As noted earlier

counsel for plaintiff has now abandoned his earlier position.

Nor

indeed does counsel for plaintiff assert that he has been
prejudiced by the form of defendant's rejection.

Rather, he is

asking to be allowed to sneak in a judgment without ever having to
produce evidence in support thereof.
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POINT V.

JUDGE FREDERICK'S JUDGMENT WITHOUT ALLOWING AN

EVIDENTIARY HEARING EXCEEDS AND MODIFIES THE RECOMMENDATION OF
COMMISSIONER PEULER.
Although defendant's prior arguments are believed to be
dispositive of this appeal, the undersigned wish to call the
Court's attention to the fact that Judge Frederick's order entered
November 20, 1984, allows the Judgment in favor of plaintiff to be
$8,411 (R.148) and awards a $150 attorney's fee to plaintiff's
attorney (R.149).

Even though he was purporting to do nothing

more than adopt Commissioner Peuler's recommendation, which
recommendation as quoted above contained no dollar amounts and no
award of fees.
Counsel for plaintiff filed an affidavit October 19,
1984, claiming a reasonable attorney's fee of $1,700 (eighteen
days after the hearing before Judge Frederick). (R.143-145)

There

was neither any discussion nor presentation of evidence in front
of Judge Frederick on the matter of fees.

Accordingly, Judge

Frederick's judgment exceeds in at least those two particulars the
Commissioner's recommendation.
Far more serious, however, is paragraph 2 of the Order,
which does not spell out dollar amounts, but nonetheless orders
the defendant to give the plaintiff a mortgage or trust deed on
the Evanston property "in the amount of the first mortgage" on
plaintiff's house at 4612 Belmour Way. (R148-149)

That was the

very issue that Commissioner Peuler refused to rule on and did not
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make a recommendation on because she did not have sufficient
evidentiary facts nor proffers.

At that hearing counsel for

plaintiff agreed with the Commissioner.

Now, before Judge

Frederick, without any evidence, he presumes to put in Judge
Frederick's order the very thing that Commissioner Peuler was
unwilling to do and which he agreed should not be done.
POINT VI.

THERE IS, EVEN IN THE ABBREVIATED RECORD

BEFORE THIS COURT, SUFFICIENT FACTUAL MATERIAL THAT WOULD SUGGEST
THAT THE OPPOSITE RESULT WOULD HAVE BEEN REACHED BY THE DISTRICT
COURT HAD THERE BEEN AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING AND REQUIRES AT THE
VERY LEAST THAT IN FAIRNESS AND EQUITY AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING
SHOULD BE ORDERED BY THIS COURT.
The evidence referred to in this point has already been
alluded to in Point III above, and while not exhaustive, should at
least demonstrate that there is a substantial dispute as to the
facts that would give rise to justifying an order or judgment's
being entered in this matter against the defendant without having
had a chance to produce evidence before a fact-finding body.

Such

a result flies in the face of all principles of fair play, as well
as the rules of this court and of the other courts of this state,
all of which are designed to permit every litigant his full day in
court.
POINT VII.

THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF COMMISSIONER PEULER

AS ADOPTED BY JUDGE FREDERICK ARE ERRONEOUS IN ANY EVENT.
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The errors heretofore alleged in this Brief by the
defendant go mainly to the proposition that defendant has never
had his day in court.

However, even if this Court should conclude

that the defendant has had his day in court, the result reached by
the District Court is in any event erroneous.

The Decree of

Divorce required that the defendant make certain mortgage payments
on the family home which the Decree awarded to the plaintiff.

As

noted above, after the Divorce Decree was entered the plaintiff
sold the home and the new buyer assumed the indebtedness for the
mortgage.

That appears to be dispositive of the matter.

The

Divorce Decree did not require that the defendant pay plaintiff
the said mortgage payments, but rather that he pay the holder of
the mortgage.

Plaintiff has never alleged that she paid the

mortgage and is entitled to reimbursement.

She has not made that

allegation and indeed she could not because she did not make the
mortgage payments on the house.

They were made by the new buyer.

There has been no modification of the Decree ordering that the
defendant make any payments whatever to the plaintiff, and it
cannot be supposed that the trial court intended that defendant
make payments to the holder of a mortgage which would only benefit
some third party.

When plaintiff sold the home and the debt was

assumed by a third-party buyer, the provision in the Divorce
Decree relating to payment of that mortgage was satisfied and
terminated.
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Finally, we desire to point out to the Court that the
Decree does not state whether or not the order for payment of the
first mortgage was intended to be in the nature of alimony or in
the nature of a property settlement.

Commissioner Peuler made no

finding or recommendation as to whether the claimed arrears was
alimony or property settlement.

Judge Frederick permitted no

evidentiary hearing and merely adopted the recommendation of the
Commissioner, yet his Order for the first time purports to refer
to the alleged arrears as "property settlement."

There was no

evidence ever allowed into the case to support that finding and no
recommendation with regard thereto, and that finding is thus
erroneous in any event.
Going beyond that, however, this Court has held that how
a particular award is designated in the decree is not
determinative of whether it is in the nature of alimony or a
property settlement.

In Erickson v. Beardall, 20 Ut 2d 287, 437

P2d 210 (1968), this Court held at page 289:
" . . . that it is the duty of the court to look to
substance rather than to form. This is especially true
where rights and responsibilities with respect to the
family relationship are being dealt with. . . .
"It is shown that the plaintiff's means of support
would have been inadequate without the provision of the
decree that the defendant pay these obligations, and
there is ample basis for the trial court's finding that
this requirement was for her support and maintenance."
In the instant case the plaintiff was only awarded $1.00
per year as alimony denominated as such.

The order to pay the

first mortgage was for the obvious purpose of providing housing
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for the plaintiff and the children of the parties.

Normally in

such a case the husband would be required to pay the wife alimony,
from which the wife makes the house payment.

The fact that the

husband made the mortgage payment directly to the holder of the
mortgage still had the net effect of providing support for the
wife.

Having the mortgage payment paid by defendant permitted the

plaintiff's own earnings to be used in other areas of support such
as food, clothing and the like.

Since the plaintiff remarried

prior to the accrual to the arrears referred to in plaintiff's
Order to Show Cause, the award must be held to have terminated
pursuant to Section 30-3-5(5), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, which
states as follows:
"Unless a decree of divorce specifically provides
otherwise, any order of the court that a party pay
alimony to a former spouse automatically terminates upon
the remarriage of that former spouse . . . "
We therefore respectfully submit that if the order
requiring the defendant to make payments on the first mortage is
alimony, such alimony terminated prior to the accrual of the said
arrearage.

If, on the other hand, that determination cannot be

made upon the record, defendant is at least entitled to have his
day in court on this issue as the purported finding by the trial
court that the payment of the mortgage was a "property settlement"
provision was not the subject of the recommendation purportedly
adopted by Judge Frederick and should be reversed and the parties
given the opportunity to present evidence on the issue of the
nature of the said mortgage payments.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully submitted
that this Court reverse the judgment of the District Court
anddirect entry of judgment for defendant as a matter or law, or
at least remand the matter for an evidentiary hearing before a
District Judge on all issues raised by the original Order to Show
Cause brought by the plaintiff in this matter.
Respectfully submitted:

GORDON A. MADSEN
ROBERT C. CUMMINGS
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant
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Courts of the State of Utah; or that such a pretrial order be
prepared before a final settlement conference or trial date is
set.
Rule 6

Jury Trials - Civil

Rule 4.2 of the Rules of Practice in the District
Courts and Circuit Courts of the State of Utah shall not apply
in the Third Judicial District Court.
(a) Cases will be set for jury trial only upon
the filing of a written demand for jury trial and the payment
of the required statutory fee deposited with the clerk of court
witnin the time provided herein. Such written demand for jury
trial and the payment of the required statutory fee must be
filed no later than ten (10) days prior to trial or at sucn
other time as the trial Jgdgjo_may_.nrdftr-J—The--court-may in its
discreti"dn7~upon motion, order a trial by jury of any or all
issues.
Rule 7 Motions for Supplemental Proceedings
Motions for supplemental proceedings will be set on
the regular weekly supplemental proceedings calendar before a
clerk of tne court. Counsel may alternatively schedule the
matter to be heard before the judge assigned to the case on the
assigned judge's regular law and motion calendar.
Rule 3

Domestic Relations Commissioner

(a) A Domestic Relations Commissioner may be
appointed for the purpose of assisting the court in domestic
relations matters as directed by the court.
(b) All domestic relations matters, including
orders to show cause, pretrial conferences, petitions for
modification of a divorce decree, scneduling conferences, and
all other applications for relief, except ex parte motions,
shall be referred to the Domestic Relations Commissioner before
any hearing may be scheduled before the assigned District Court
Judge, unless otherwise ordered by the assigned judge.
(c) The Commissioner shall, after hearing any
motion or other application for relief, recommend entry of an
order thereon, and shall further make a written recommendation
as- to each matter heard. Should the parties not consent to the
recommended order, the matter shall be referred for further
disposition by the assigned judge.
(d) Any party objecting to the recommended order
or seeking further hearing before the assigned judge shall,
within five (5) days of the entry of the Commissioner's
recommendations provide notice to the Commissioner's office and
opposing counsel that the recommended order is not acceptable
or that further hearing is desired. The Commissioner shall
then^refer the matter to the assigned judge for further
hearing, conference or trial. If no objection or request for
further hearing is made within five (5) days, said party shall
be deemed to have consented to entry of an order in conformance
with the Commissioner's recommendation.

(e) All recommendations of the Commissioner
accepted by the parties shall be presented to the court and
opposing counsel pursuant to Rule 4 of these Rules. All
proposed judgments, orders and decrees must be approved as to
form by the signature of the Commissioner before presentation
to rne a Signed judge in the case.
(f) Any party obtaining a temporary restraining
order or other temporary order pending a hearing shall be
responsible for obtaining from the assigned judge any extension
v_nereof before the expiration date as may be necessary pending
hearing before the Commissioner of the assigned judge.
Rule 9

Probate

(a) The probate calendar will be assigned to
a District Court Judge in Salt Lake County on a rotating
assignment basis each January and July 1.
(b) Pursuant to Utah Uniform Probate Code,
Sections 75-1-201 and 75-1-307, the juage assigned to the
probate division of the Third Judicial District Court is
appointed registrar to act in that capacity as required
(c) The probate clerk pursuant to Section
75-1-401, Utah Uniform Probate Code is grantea authority to
order and schedule dates for hearing and to prepare the probate
calendar of matters to be heard by the judge assigned to the
probate division of the court
(d) Pursuant to Sections 75-1-102(1) and
75-1-102(2) Utah Uniform Probate Code, the probate clerk is
authorized to use the signature stamp of the assigned probace
judge on informal matters presented to the court for handling
Rule 10

Adoptions

(a) The adoption calendar will be assigned to a
District Court Judge in Salt Lake County on a rotating
assignment basis each January and July 1.
(b) Pursuant to Section 78-30-14, Utah Code
Annotated, 1953 as amended, pertaining to a request by the
court for the Division of Family Services to verify the
petition and conduct an investigation in adoptions, the
petitioners shall, sixty (60) days or more prior to the hearing
on the adoption unless such period is waived by the assigned
judge, file with the court a motion and order either requesting
an investigation or waiving an investigation
If a motion is
filed to waive the investigation, an affidavit shall be filed
by the petitioners setting forth the following information
pertaining to the petitioners
(1) name, (2) place of
residence for the last five years, (3) age, (4) marital status,
including all prior marriages, (5) dependent children, (6)
information on ownership of home, (7) employment within last
five years, (8) average income for the past year, (9) where and
how the child was placed with petitioners, (10) information on
natural parents, (11) other pertinent information.
(c) All petitioners and/or counsel shall certify
no later than ten (10) days prior to the scheduled hearing date

AARON ALMA NELSON
BAYLE, HANSON, NELSON & CHIPMAN
Attorneys for Plaintiff
1300 Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 364-3627
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
ROSEMARY WISCOMBE,

]

Plaintiff,

)

ANSWERS TO INTERROGATORIES

)

Civil No. D79-2603
JUDGE J. DENNIS FREDERICK

vs.
J. WILLIAM WISCOMBE,
Defendant.
STATE OF UTAH

)
: ss.
)

County of \jJ^{CK

Plaintiff answers defendant's Interrogatories as follows:
1.

Following the Decree of Divorce entered in the above-

entitled action June 23, 1981, how long thereafter did you
continue to reside in the family home at 4 612 Belmour Way,
Salt Lake City, Utah?
ANSWER:
2.

On what date did you move from said residence?

ANSWER:
3.

September 5, 1981.

Did you list said home for sale?

ANSWER:
4.

Two months.

Yes.

When was said home sold?
(a)

For what price?
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(b)

On what terms?

(c)

How much was the down payment?

(d)

What is the name (names) of the buyers?

(e)

Was said home conveyed to buyer by uniform

real estate contract, deed and mortgage or trust deed?
(f)

Was there any escrow account established for

the payment of the underlying mortgages?
(g)

What arrangements were made with regard to

those mortgages and payment thereof?
(h)

What grace period was provided for the buyer

in the event of default?
(i)

What notice of the sale did you give to the

lending institutions holding the mortgages?
(j)

Who has made the payments on both mortgages

from that date to the present?
(k)

What monthly payments have you received over

and above the mortgage payments from the sale of that home?
(1)

What total amount of consideration have you

received to apply on your equity in the home from the time of
sale to the present?
(m)

How much is attributable to interest in that

total sum received on your equity?
ANSWER:

The home was sold on contract on June 30, 1982.

a.

$110,000.

b.

Uniform Real Estate Contract.

c.

$30,000.
Addendum 4

d.

Jose N. Roco.

e.

Uniform Real Estate Contract.

f.

Yes.

g.

Escrow agent makes payment to Deseret Federal

Savings & Loan.
h.

Thirty days.

i.

None.

j.

Alder-Wallace, Inc., as escrow agent for RoseMary

k.

$188.19 per month, excepting a six-month period of

T. Siggard.

time, at which time it was necessary to pay $124.0 5 in late charges
accrued because of defendant's late payments before the divorce.
During this six-month period of time, the amount received was
approximately $167.00 per month.

5.

1.

None, other than established monthly payment.

m.

Unknown•

Did you purchase a condominium in St. George, Utah?
(a)

What was the date of such purchase?

(b)

What was the purchase price?

(c)

On what terms?

(d)

How much did you pay down?

(e)

From whom did you buy said condominium?

(f)

Was it on a contract or deed and mortgage or

trust deed?
(g)

How many monthly payments did you make on the

purchase of said condominium?
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(h)

If you defaulted, when did you so default?

(i)

Did you move from said condominium?

(j)

If so, when?

(k)

Did you rent that condominium?

(1)

If so, on what terms?

(m)

For what time period?

ANSWER:

Yes.

a.

May 15, 1982.

b.

$79,000.

c.

$1,000 down payment and assumption of First Trust

Deed at Zions First National Sank in the amount of $46,321.75
and Second Trust Deed to Nixon & Nixon, Inc., in the amount of
$31,994.13.

6.

d.

$1,000.

e.

Mixon & Nixon, Inc.

f.

Contract,

q.

23.

h.

Not applicable,

i.

Yes.

j.

June, 1983.

k.

Yes.

1.

$350 per month and $60 per month homeowners fees,

m.

Month-to-month for one year.

Did you remarry?
(a)

To whom?

(b)

When?

Addendum 6

-4-

(c)

Did you move into your second husband's home?

(d)

Where is it located?

(e)

When did you move?

(f)

Were the children of the marriage to Mr. Wiscombe

with you at all material times that you resided at Salt Lake
City, at the condominium in St. George, and at the home of your
second husband?
(g)

Where do you presently reside?

(h)

Are the children still residing with ycu in that

location?
ANSWER:

7.

Yes.

a.

Richard Siggard.

b.

May 18, 1983.

c.

No.

d.

St. George, Utah.

e.

June, 198 3.

f.

Yes.

g.

36 37 Pomegranate Way, St. George,-Utah,

h.

Yes.

Home was purchased at 'cime of marriage.

Have you at any time made efforts at refinancing

your contract of sale on the home in Salt Lake or cashing the
same out?
ANSWER:
8.

No.

Have you made any efforts at any time to refinance

your equity or purchase in the condominium in St. George?
ANSWER:

No.
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9.

What is the status of any foreclosure on the condominiun

in St. George?
ANSWER:

None.

Quit Claim Deed was given to original

seller, Nixon & Nixon, Inc.
10.

What efforts have been made to avoid such foreclosure?

ANSWER:

See answer to Interrogatory No. 9.
'

i'

•

-

ROSEMARY, T. SIGGARD
Plaintiff
Subscribed and sworn to before me this •/ " >

day cf

September, 1984.

Notary Public
Residing at: ,

hJ

/

/

/

My Commission Expires

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
Mailed a copy of the foregoing Answers to Interrogatories
this

U^

day of

^Cft-W(Uv,

, 1984, to:

Gordon A. Madsen
Attorney for Defendant
320 South Third East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Secretary
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GORDON A.
ROBERT C.
Attorneys
320 South
Salt Lake
Telephone
5F

MADSEN, #2048
CUMMINGS, #7 77
for Defendant
Third East
City, Utah 84111
322-1141
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

ROSEMARY WISCOMBE,
Plaintiff ,
AFFIDAVIT OF COMMISSIONER
SANDRA PEULER

vs.
J. WILLIAM WISCOMBE

Case No. 20333

Defendant.
STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)
) ss .
)

Sandra Peuler, having been duly sworn upon her oath,
deposes and says:
1.

That she is over the age of 21 years, competent and

makes this affidavit upon personal knowledge.
2.

That she is the Domestic Relations Commissioner for

the Third Judicial District Court and was acting as such on the
9th day of August, 1984.
3.

That the usage in her courtroom, both before and

since the adoption of Rules of Procedure for the Third District
Court, and particularly as it relates to Rule 8(d), was and is
that if a party in a domestic relations matter did not agree or

Addendum 9

concur with the said Commissioner's recommended order, the party
could so inform the Court at the time; or should such party wish
additional time for deliberation before deciding, could do so at
any time within five (5) days from the date of the hearing.

Such

notice or communication of disagreement or nonconcurrence has
never been required by Commissioner Peuler to be submitted in
writing.

Frequently the nonconcurrence was announced in open

court at the time the recommended order was announced, in which
case such nonconcurrence would be noted in the minute entry for
that date.

Such a disagreement or nonconcurrence on the part of

the defendant in the case of Wiscombe v. Wiscombe was made by
counsel in open court and so noted on Commissioner Peuler's minute
entry in that matter dated August 9, 1984, copy of which is
annexed hereto as Exhibit A.

SANDRA PEULER, COMMISSIONER
Subscribed and sworn to before me this

day of

December, 1984.

Notary Public
Residing at:
My Commission Expires:
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Plaintiff

CAS? NO:

. Ujsvt^-^r^
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Defendant

°ype of hearing: Div.
'resent: Pttf ^

>. Atty:

Annul,
D e f t J
. _^_
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). Atty:
„„£j
*
Iworn & Examined:
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Hhers:

^

V
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w

IX

^QSC.
(^
Other.
Supp. Order_
Stipulation
Summons,
Waiver^
Publication
D Default of
o l Pltf/Deft Entered
Date: _

Deft:_
Clerk: _
Reporter:
Bailiff: _

i&

#.j?>&f*t-

<33&£22

>RDERS:
•

Custody Awarded To

I
J

Custody Evaluation Ordered
Visitation Rights

]
"]
]

Pltf/Deft Awarded Support $
x
Pltf/Deft Awarded Alimony $
Payments to be made through the Clerk's Office:

]
]

Atty. fees to the.
Home To:

=
Per Month/Year

D

. Per Month
Alimony Waived

in the amount of

•

Deferred

J Furnishings To:
. Automobile To:
Each Party Awarded their Personal Property
Pltf/Deft. to Maintain Debts and Obligations
Pltf/Deft. to Maintain Insurance on Minor Children
Restraining Order Entered Against
Pltf/Deft. Granted Judgment for Arrearage in the Sum of $_
90-Day Waiting Period is Waived
Divorce Gnnted To
As
Decree To become Final: • Upon Entry
• 3-Month Interlocutory
Forrr er Name of

Is Restored

Bdjed c i ^ a failure of Deft to aopear in response to an order of the court and on motion of PItfs counsel, court
orders
/
shall issue for Deft
'
Ret_ ..
Bai*
B is( i n
c v
"l r

'

3., stiry-'a on of r:-t etr/e counsel/motion of Plaintiff's counsel, and good cause appearing therefor,
»'<•* r ' . c i ' i ' i^
c — 'he same is hereby dismissed without prejudice.
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II

NOTICE OF EXISTING UNIFORM REAL ESTATE CONTRACT

36*38859

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that pursuant to the terms and provisions

of a certian Uniform Real Estate Contract dated

June 30, 1982

which

was heretofore duly executed and which now continues to be in full force
and effect, the undersigned parties are the seller
following described tract of land situated in

and buyer

Salt Lake

of the

County,

State of Utah, to-wit:
CC**MENCING AT THE NORTHEASTERLY CORNER OF LOT 6, LOCUST GROVE, ACCORDING
TO THE OFFICIAL PLAT THEREOF ON FILE AND OF RECORD IN THE SALT LAKE
COUNTY RECORDER'S OFFICE, AND RUNNING THENCE SOUTH 31 "DEGREES EAST 66
FEET TO THE SOUTHEASTERLY CORNER OF SAJD LOT 6, THENCE SOUTHWESTERLY
ALCNG THE SOUTHERLY LINE OF SAID LOT, 99 FEET; THENCE NORTH 31 DEGREES
WEST 68 FEET; MORE OR LESS TO THE NORTHERLY LINE OF SAID LOT 6, THENCE
NORTH 60 DEGREES 29 MINUTES 30 SECONDS EAST TO A POINT SOUTH 54 DEGREES
00 MINUTES 10 SECONDS WEST 62.17 FEET FROM THE POINT OF BEGINNING; THENCE
NORTH 54 DEGREES 00 MINUTES 10 SECONDS EAST 62.17 FEET TO THE POINT OF
BEGINNING.

Jkfli^/Mi^^

A * /C^cf'
(SE N . BOC6

&JUJJJWL_ .

ywiSCQMBE

(Buyer)

(Seller)

r
STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE
On this

30th

appeared before me

)
) ss.
)
day of

, '19 82 , personally

June

ROSE MARY T. WISCOMBE, and JOSE N. ROCO

the signer(s) of the within instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that
the y executed the same.

AiAl
Notary Public

My Commission Expires: 6-6-85

Residing at:
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UNIFORM REAL ESTATE CONTRACT
"This is Q l e g a l l y b i n d i n g f o r m , if not ond*-< stood, seek corr.pe'ent a d v i c e . "

I. THIS AGREEMENT, made in duplicate this
hy and between ROSE MARY T . WISCQMBE
hereinafter designated a* the Seller, and _. J OSE

N

30th
_

day of
.

* ***£) .. __

. June
...

t

A. D., 19.82

..

hereinafter designated as the Buyer, of . S a l t L a k e Cit&__ U t a h

.._

-. WITNESSETH: That the Seller, for the consideration herein mentioned agrees to sell and convoy to the buyer,
and the bu\cr for the consideration herein mentioned agrees to purchase the following described real property, situate in

•h* eounty'of .Salt^ Lake

state of Utah, to-wit: 4612j3etoourJfay,

aCjJ«ah_J4117_

ADDRESS

More particularly described as follows:

COMMENCING AT THE NORTHEASTERLY CORNER OF LOT 6, LOCUST GRO/E, ACCORDING
TO THE OFFICIAL PLAT THEREOF ON FILE AND OF RECORD IN TFIE SALT LAKE
COUNTY RECORDER'S OFFICE, AND RUNNING THENCE SOUTH 31 DEGREES EAST 66
FEET TO THE SOUTHEASTERLY CCBNER OF SAID LOT 6, THENCE SOUTHWESTERLY
ALONG THE SOUTHERLY LINE OF SAID LOT, 99 FEET; THENCE NORTH 31 DEGREES
WEST 68 FEET; MORE OR LESS TO THE NORTHERLY LINE OF SAID LOT 6, THENCE
NORTH 60 DEGREES 29 MINUTES 30 SECONDS EAST TO A POINT SOUTH 54 DEGREES
00 MINUTES 10 SECONDS WEST 62.17 FEET FROM THE POINT OF'BEGINNING; THENCE
NORTH 54 DEGREES 00 MINUTES 10 SECONDS EAST 62.17 FEET TO THE POINT OF
.1. Saiu MfyvrTBereby agrees to enter into possession and pay for said described premises the sum of QNF HUNDRED

TEN THOUSAND AND N O / 1 Q 0 - ™ — - —
pavalde at the office of Seller, his assigns or order

———----.----"-7-"--..
as

Dollars ($.110^.000^00 >

_ ^4?SCted by S e l l e r s

strietl> within the following times, to-wit: THIRTY THOUSAND AND f&lQQ——-~
cash, the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, and the balance of $

§0f 0 0 0 . 0 0 .

{%

30, 0 0 0 . 0 0 .

,

_ . shall be paid as follows:

"SEE ADDENDUM ATTACHED HERETO AND BY THIS REFERENCE MADE A PART HEREOF"

Possession of said premises shall be delivered to buyer on the

30th

day <»f

June

, 19.82-.

4. Said monthly payments are to be applied first to ihe payment of interest and second to the reduction of the
principal. Interest shall be charged from _ .Junfi-.30f~.1982
- .— . _ .
on all unpaid portions of the
purchase price at the rate of TWELVE
| H . r Cl . n t ( _ 1 2 . 0 0 <; ) fM.r annum. The Huyer. at bis option at anytime,
may pay amounts in excess of the monthly payments upon the unpaid balance subject to the limitations of any mortgage
or contract by the Buyer herein assumed, such excess to be applied either to unpaid principal or in prepayment of future
installments at the election of the buyer, which election must be made at the time the excess payment is mode.
f>. It is understood and agreed that if the Seller accepts payment from the liuyer on this contract less than according
to the terms herein mentioned, then by so doing, it will in no way alter the terms of the contract as to the forfeiture
hereinafter stipulated, or as to any other remedies of the seller.
G. It is understood that there presently exists an obligation against said property in favor of DsseflTQft.„Fj6Qgral

Savings and LoajVDeseret Federal Savings and Loan,
$^l#J68.9p/14 t OOg.J0qL_. f as of 5-1-82/5-1-82

with a u unpaU1

balance of

7. Seller represents that there arc no unpaid special improvement district taxes covering improvements to said premises now in the process of being installed, or which have been completed and not paid for, outstanding against said property, except the following - N Q ^ E x e e p t l o n s ...
_,_
8. The Seller is given the option to secure, execute and maintain loans secured by said property of not to exceed the
then unpaid contract balance hereunder, bearing interest at the rate of not to exc<-ed

TWELVE-

"**"""""" percent

( 1 2 . 0 0 ' ' , ) per annum ami payable in regular monthh installment.• ; provided that the .-igirregale monthly installment
payments required to be made by Seller on said loans shall not be greater than each installment payment required to be
made by the liuyer under this contract. When the principal due hereunder has been reduced to the amount of any such
loans arid mortgages the Seller agrees to convey and the Huycr agrees to accept title to the above described property
subject to said loans and mortgages.
i>. If the liuyer desires to exercise his right through accelerated payments under this agreement to pay off any obligations outstanding at date of ibis aerreement aeainst said profntiy, it shall be the Buyer's obligation to assume and
pay any penalty which may be required on prepayment of said prior obligations. Prepayment penalties in respect
to obligations against said property incurred b\ seller, after date of this agreement, shall be paid by seller unless
said obligations are assumed or approved by buyer.
10. The Buyer agrees upon written request of the Seller to make application to a reliable lender for a loan of such
amount as can be secured under the regulations of said lender and hereby agrees to apply any amount so received upon
the purchase price above mentioned, and to execute the papers required and pay one-half the expense* necessary in obtaining said loan, the Seller agreeing to pay the other one-half, provided however, that the monthly payments and
interest rate required, shall not exceed the monthly pa> merits and interest rate as outlined above.
11. The Huycr agrees to pay all taxes and assessments of e\cry kind and nature which are or which may be assessed
and which may become due on these premises during the life of this agreement. The Seller hereby covenants and agrees
that there are no assessments against said premises except the following:

No Exceptions
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T h e Seller f u r t h e r c o v e n a n t s and a g r e e s t h a t be will not default in the p a y m e n t of his obligations against said property.
\'2. The B u y e r a g r e e s to pay the g e n e r a l taxe< a f t e r

_Jl2ITfi 3 0 #

1982

l.'l. The Buyer f u r t h e r a g r e e s to k»>cp all i n s u r a b l e buildings and i m p r o v e m e n t s on said premises insured in a company acceptable to the Seller in the amount of not loss than the unpaid balance on this contract, or $ 80, 000 ..00 _.
a n d to a s s i g n said i n s u r a n c e to the Seller a> hi.^ intcroMs may a p p e a r an.l to th-liv« r the insuiancc policy to him.
14. In t h e e v e n t the Buyer .shall default in tne p a y m e n t ol anv special «»r IMIIIKI! laves. ;i.-..s.'ssiucnis or insurance
p r e m i u m s a s herein provided, the Seller may, at his optica, pay said t a x e s , a s s e s s m e n t s and iM.-urauee premiums or either
ol" t h e m , and if Seller elects so to do. r hen the Buyer a g r e e s to ivpav the Seller up«»r- demand, all Mich sums so advanced
a n d paid by htm, t o g e t h e r with i n t o r e s ' tin icon from date of p a y m e n t of said .aim.; at the r a t e <>l ^ of one percent per
m o u t h until paid.
|."i. Buyer a g r e e ? t h a t he will not commit or -a-.ffer to lx i c o m m i t t e d any v av.tc, -poil, or destn:ction in or upon
said p r e m i s e s , and t h a t he will m a i n t a i n said prcioises in good condition.
III. In t h e e v e n t of a failure to comply with the t e r m s hereof by the Buyer, or upon failure of the Buyer to make
a n y payment or p a y m e n t s when the s:»n,e shall become due. or within
InlKlx
\JUJ
^lXy& thereafter, the
Seller, at his option shall have the foil twieg a l t e r n a t i v e r e m e d i e s :
.\. Seller shall have the l i g h t , upon failure of the Buyer tn remedy the default within five days after w r i t t e n notice,
to IK* released from all obligations in law and in equity to convey said pco|>erly, and all payments which have
been made t h e r e t o f o r e on this c o n t r a c t by the Buyer, shall be foi foiled to the Seller as liquidated d a m a g e s for
the n o n - p e r f o r m a n c e of Uie c o n t r a c t , ami the Buyer a g r e e s t h a t the Seller may a t his option re-enter and take
possession of said p r e m i s e s without legal processes as in its first ami former e s t a t e , together with all improvem e n t s and a d d i t i o n s m a d e by the B u y e r thereon, anil the said additions and i m p r o v e m e n t s shall remain with
the laud and become the p r o p e r t y of the Seller, tin Buyer becoming at once*a t e n a n t at will of the Seller; or
B. T h e Seller may b r i n g fuit and recover j u d g e m e n t tor all delinquent i n s t a l l m e n t s , including costs and a t t o r n e y s
fees. ( T h e use of this r e m e d y on one or more occasions shall not p r e v e n t the Seller, a t bis option, from r e s o r t i n g
to one of the other r e m e d i e s h e r e u n d e r in the event oi' a subsequent d e f a u l t ) : or
t*. The Svller shall have the r i g h t , a t his option, and upon written notice to the Buyer, to declare the entire unpaid
balance h e r e u n d e r a t once due and payable, ami may elect to treat this contract as a note and m o r t a g e , and pass
title to the Buyer subject t h e r e t o , and proceed immediately to fore-, lose the s a m e in accordance with the laws of
the S t a t e of U t a h , and have the p r o p e r t y sold and the proceeds applied to the P a y m e n t of the balance owing,
including costs and a t t o r n e y ' s fees; and the Seller may have a j u d g e m e n t for any.deficiency which may r e m a i n .
In t h e case of foreclosure, the Seller h e r e u n d e r , upon the filing of i complaint, shall IM- immediately entitled to
the a p p o i n t m e n t of a receiver to ttk>- possession of said m o r t g a g e d p r o p e r t y and collect the rents, issues and
p r o f i t s therefrom and apply the s a m e to the p a y m e n t of the obligation h e r e u n d e r , or bold the same p u r s u a n t
to o r d e r of the c o u r t ; and the Seller, upon e n t r y of j u d g m e n t of foreclosure, shall be entitled to the possession
of the said p r e m i s e s d u r i n g the period of redemption.
17. It is a g r e e d t h a t t i m e is the essence of this a g r e e m e n t .
l>. In t h e e v e n t there a r c any liens or e n c u m b r a n c e s a g a i n s t said premise - other than !ho-c herein provided for or
referred to. or in the event any liens or c n c u ' n b r a n c c * other than herein provided for shall hereafter accrue a g a i n s t the
s a m e !•> a c t s or neglect of the Seller, then the B o w r may. at In - option, pay and d i s c h a r g e the same and receive, credit
on th;« a m o u n t then r e m a i n i n g due h e r e u n d e r in the amount of any * licit payment or p a y m e n t s and thereafter the paym e n t s herein provided to be made, m a \ , at the option of the B-iver. be Mi-peiidcd until such a lime as such suspended
p a y m e n t s s h a l l equal any s u m s advanced as aforesaid.
It*. T h e Seller on receiving the p a v m e u t s herein reserved to be paid at the time and in the manner above mentioned
a g r e e s to e x e c u t e and deliver to the Buyer or a s s i g n s , a good and sufficient \\ a r r a n t v «leed conveying the title to the
above described premises free and clear of ali i n< u n i b r a n c c - except as herein mentioned and except as may have accrued
by oi t h r o u g h the acts or neglect of the B u \ e r . and to furnish at bis expense, a policy of title insurance in the a m o u n t
o'" the p u r c h a s e price or a t the option of the Seller, an a b s t r a c t brought to d a t e at time of sale or at any lime d u r i n g the
t rn »f this a g r e e m e n t , or at time of deliver) o( deed, at the op'ion of Buyer.
j o . It i« h e r e b y e x p r e s s l y understood and a g r e e d by the p a r t i e s hereto that the Buyer a d e p t s the said property
in it- p r e s e n t condition and t h a t t h e r e a r e no r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s , covenants, or a g r e e m e n t s between the parties hereto with
n-lVn nee to said p r o p e r t y except a^ herein specifically

set forth or attached hereto

N° E x c e p t i o n s ,

:i. The B u y e r and Seller each a g r e e t h a t -hould they default in any of the covenants or a g r e e m e n t s contained here
reasonable a t t o r n e y ' s fee, which may arise
in. t h a t the d e f a u l t i n g p a r t y shall pay all costs and expenses, including
or a« i rue from enforcing this a g r e e m e n t , or in obtaining possession of the premises covered hereby, or in pursuing any
remedv nrovided h e r e u n d e r or by the s t a t u t e s of the S t a t e of Utah w h e t h e r such remedy is pursued by filing a suit
or o t h e r w i s e .
J*_\ It is understood t h a t the s t i p u l a t i o n s aforesaid a r e to apply to and bind the heirs, executors, a d m i n i s t r a t o r s , successor.--, and a s s r g n s of the respective p a r l i e s hereto.
IN W I T N E S S W H E K E O F , the sa'd p a r t i e s to this a g r e e m e n t have h e r e u n t o signed their names, the day and year
fir.-d above w r i t t e n .
S i g n e r in the p r e s e n c e of

li-^jLit\J!L£JUJ-£ L(.'>.iUM/><_,

•p

' A

,^1't
Buyer

o
B
CD

©

C 129
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ADDENDUM TO UNIFORM REAL ESTATE CONITOCT
DATED: June 30, 1982
BUYERS; JOSE N. RQCO
SELLERS; ROSE MARY T. WISCCMBE

A. The unpaid contract balance of $ 80,000.00
as follows:

shall be paid
^ „ vi

1. The sum of $ 958.00
shall be paid to Seller on or before
the 30th
day of July
, 198__, and the sum of
$ 958.00
shall be paid to Seller on or before the 30th
day of each succeeding month thereafter until June^l992
^
, at which tine the total unpaid balance
together with interest accrued thereon at
TVELVE—•—
PERCEm* (12.00
% ) , shall be paid in full.
The sum of $ 822.90
being the monthly principal and interest
amount, $ 91.10
of said payment to be applied toward the
general property taxes, $ 39.00
to be applied toward
the hazard insurance, and" $ 5_00
of said payment to be
applied toward the monthly contract collection service fee to
Alder Wallace
*
.
2.

It is understood and agreed that as Seller's monthly payments
to
Deseret Federal Savings and Loan
_________________
increase or decrease for general property taxes and hazard
insurance premiums, the Buyer's monthly payment to Seller shall
increase or decrease accordingly. It is further understood
and agreed that Buyer shall pay to Seller a late charge
identical to that late charge assessed by said lender in
the event Buyer's monthly payment should exceed 10
days
past due. (Said late charge being 4% of payment)

3.

It is hereby understood and agreed that should the underlying
lender,
Deseret Federal Savings and Loan
increase the interest rate of said Trust Deed Note secured by
Trust Deed, the Buyer shall accordingly increase interest to
the Seller in the amount equal to the increase in the monthly
payment required by the escalation of interest rate.

It is hereby understood and agreed that a non-alienation and/or nonassumption provision is contained in the underlying Deed of Trust in
favor of Deseret Federal Savings and Loan
as Beneficiary, and that pursuant to the terms of said provision, the
execution of this contract by the Seller may be deemed a violation and
breach. It is hereby agreed that should the lender seek those remedies
available (including acceleration of the remaining unpaid loan balance
and/or escalation of the original loan interest rate to current interest
rates) the Buyer shall have the obligation to do one of the following:
A. Obtain adequate refinancing or loan proceeds sufficient to repay the
remaijung contract balance or
B. Affirmatively negotiate with Deseret Federal Savings and Loan
, to derive an acceptable increase in interest
rate*
Buyer and Seller do hereby hold Associated Title Company and all real
estate agents related to this transaction liarmless and free of any and
all liability, or damages which may result from closing this contract
sale in violation of said non-assumption/non-alicnation provision.
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ADDENDUM
DATED:
BUYERS;
SELLERS:

TO UNIFORM REAL ESTATE CONTRACT
June 30, 1982
JOSE N. ROCO
ROSE MARY T. W1SCCMBE

Page 2
3. Simultaneously with the execution of this Agreement an Escrow and Contract
Collection Account shall be established at Alder Wallace:
snnn <foit-h 900 East. Salt Lake City, Utah 84107
(hereinafter referred to as the "Escrow Agent") and said Escrow Agent shall:
A.

Receive all payments due to Seller from the Buyer as provided in this
Contract;

B. Pay all the present underlying obligations and encumbrances listed in
Paragraph 6 hereinabove and such new obligations as may be incurred by
the Seller pursuant to the provisions of Paragraph 8 of said Contract;
C.

Pay the remaining balance of the Buyer's payments to the Sellers.

4.

Similtaneously with the execution of this Agreement,"the Seller shall deliver
to said Escrow Agent a duly executed Warranty Deed conveying the subject
property to the Buyer's free and cloar of all encumbrances with the exception
of those encumbrances which may have accrued by or through the acts or
neglect of the Buyer and/or those encumbrances assumed by the Buyer pursuant
to Paragraph 6 hereinabove. Said Escrow Agent shall deliver to Euyer or
assigns, said Warranty Deed upon receiving the final payment from Buyer as
provided herein or upon the Buyer's assumption of the underlying encumbrances
pursuant to the provision of Paragraph 6 hereinabove.

5.

It is further agreed should Buyer sell or convey subject property, the
remaining Seller's equity shall be due and payable together with interest
accrued thereon at the rate of TWELVE PERCENT (12.00%) per annum.

J(6^E N. RQOO

BuYei-

Buyer

ROSE MARY fTwiSOQMBE

"

Seller

Seller
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AARON ALMA NELSON
BAYLE, HANSON, NELSON & CHIPMAgT *"5r.
Attorneys for Plaintiff
13 00 Continental Bank Building.B'L*
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 364-3627

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT
OF ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE

ROSEMARY WISCOMBE,
Plaintiff,
vs.
J. WILLIAM WISCOMBE,
Defendant.

State of Utah
County of {,/rJ,;,r>f

Civil No. D79-2603
Judae:

)

„ )

ss.

ROSEMARY WISCOMBE SIGGARD, being first duly sworn, deposes
and says:
1.

Affiant is the Plaintiff in the above-entitled action.

2.

Pursuant to the Decree of Divorce in the above-entitled

action on June 21, 1981, Defendant was required to pay the first
mortgage on Plaintiff's house at 4612 Belmour Way, Salt Lake
City, Utah, having a balance of approximately $52,800.00 and
monthly payments of approximately $578.00, as property settlement.
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3.

The actual amount of the monthly payments on said first

mortgage on the property is $583.00.
4.

Although demand has been made by Plaintiff upon Defen-

dant for such payments, Defendant is presently in arrears on
said payments in the sum of $6,662.00 and Defendant continues
to fail and refuse to make said payments.
5.

The Decree of Divorce further required that Defendant

execute and deliver to Plaintiff a mortgage or Trust Deed on
the real property awarded to Plaintiff at 12 01 Sage, Evanston,
Wyoming, in the amount of the first mortgage on Plaintiff's
house at 4 612 Belmour Way, Salt Lake City, Utah.

Defendant has

failed and refused to deliver said Trust Deed.
DATED chis CX

\ _c

day of

, 1984.

/
/
',

>/

', /
' ',

/
* ' ,,V-<_

-

/
\' ;<-/ •''

ROSEMARY/WISC0M3E SIGGARD /' /

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this H 6
t

day of

, 1984.
/
11 '

/'•••'

/
/>;••'.M

;

:(..'.

NOTARY" PUBLIC
~ 'x
J
Residing at , //* £{ y , 7, /,/
My Commission Expires:
-J

i t . . ' ' \i ': J

LLLiE
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*:*l E0 llir.F^S OFFlCS
' <• •

AARON ALMA NELSON
BAYLE, HANSON, NELSON & CHIPMAN
Attorneys for Plaintiff
1300 Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 364-3627

i

JUL 30 S^fli'C'l
/jAMtfjfrlG^

I\I

/..._.

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT O n SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

A/Oft

/C£

ROSE^IARY WISCOMBE,
ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE
Plaintiff,
vs.
J. WILLIAM WISCOMBE,

Defendant.

Civil No. D79-2603
Judge: Dennis Frederick

TO THE ABOVE-NAMED DEFENDANT, J. WILLIAM WISCOMBE:
YOU ARE HEREBY ORDERED to appear before Commissioner Sandra
Pueler at the Metropolitan Hall of Justice, 240 East 400 South,
Salt Lake City, Utah, on Thursday, August 9, 1984, at 3:00 p.m.,
to show cause, if any you have, why you should not be held in
contempt of Court for wilfull failure and refusal to abide by
the terms of the Decree of Divorce entered in the above-entitled
Court, why judgment should not be entered against you for your
failure to make the required payments set forth in the Affidavit
of Plaintiff in support of Order to Show Cause, why you should
not be ordered to pay Plaintiff's reasonable attorney's fees,
and why you should not be sentenced for contempt of Court.
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DATED this

?3

.*

day of

vy'-.-r c c^

,

1984

ATTEST
H. DIXON HI
By

~< V''SM/r^—^
^ *

Deputy
C&*
ity Ci4

Serve Defendant:
238 "B" Street
Salt Lake City, UT
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£OMJUM -/riatw*^

GORDON A. MADSEN
Attorney for Defendant
320 South Third East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone 322-1141

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ROSEMARY WISCOMBE,

)
)!

Plaintiff,

vs.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
OF INTERROGATORIES

]

J. WILLIAM WISCOMBE

]1

Defendant.

Civil No. D-79-2603

]

I certify that a copy of defendant's Interrogatories to
plaintiff was mailed to Aaron Alma Nelson, attorney for the
plaintiff, at his address, 1300 Continental Bank Building, Salt
Lake City, Utah

S 4 — d a y of

84101, postage prepaid, the
^~-

August, 1984.

\

*

^

/£GRDON A. MADSEN
//Attorney for Defendant
/
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nute Book Form 103

County of Salt Lake - State of Utah
CAS->*-<3~<?Plaintiff

Q. uJ^c ^

'. Atty:

Cfr

Annul..
Deft.

' c=—T"

_Jt:

/

*

7?1A<£<L*-*

Jworn & Examinad:
itf:
Dthers:

3-£?t>3

A

LS

Other.
Supp. Order.
OSC._k^
Summons,
Stipulation.
Waiver.
Publication.
D Default of Pltf/Deft Entered

Deft:

3

009-

Defendant

"ype of hearing: Div.
'resent: Pltf..—-3. Atty:

CASE NO:

n

D,.e:

2/r/*V

Judger

Cffrwy • ^> -

Clerk:

/ ^ — Q *c ^ g ^ v ^ ^ .

Reporter:
Bailiff: _

7 r _i

h^JL^M'nS

o..^^t">

ORDERS:
G
•

Custody Evaluation Ordered
Visitation Rights

p

._
Pltf/Deft Awarded Support $
x
_ Per Month/Year
Pltf/Deft Awarded Alimony $
Payments to be made through the Clerk's Officer

D

n
n

D

Custody Awarded To

Per Month

D

Alimony Waived

_ in the amount of _

Atty. fees to the

•

Deferred

Hnmp To-

G
G
G
G
•
•
•
G
G
G

Furnishings To:
Automobile To:
Each Party Awarded their Personal Property
Pltf/Deft. to Maintain Debts and Obligations
Pltf/Deft. to Maintain Insurance on Minor Children
Restraining Order Entered Against
Pltf/Deft. Granted Judgment for Arrearage in the Sum of $_
90-Day Waiting Period is Waived
Divorce Granted To
As
Decree To Become Final: G Upon Entry
3-Month Interlocutory
Former Name of

G

Based on the failure of Deft to appear in response to an order of the court and on motion of PItfs counsel, cou
orders
/
shall issue for Deft
. Bail.
Returnable.

G

Based on written stipulation of respective counsel/motion of Plaintiff's counsel, and good cause appearing therefc
court orders the above case be and the same is hereby dismissed without prejudice.

. Is Restore

3 " " Based on w>ittenT3apgtafoo of respective counsel/FTtetroTTtrfi^t^

w*6<* , * - ^ > ^ ^ > .

•f^^-^-->n^

r d ^

(-<*

£<-•<$

r?^<^^

•o &~<z~m.-^L~>£r

r<L

^zZi^t^
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v

V

9

r>* GORDON

--*)

A. MADSEN
Attorney for Defendant
320 South Third East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone 322-1141
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ROSEMARY WISCOMBE,
Plaintiff,
NOTICE

vs.
J. WILLIAM WISCOMBE

Civil No. D-79-2603

Defendant.
TO THE PLAINTIFF AND HER ATTORNEY, AARON ALMA NELSON:
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the Order to Show Cause heard by
Commissioner Sandra Peuler on August 9, 1984, has been referred to
the Honorable J. Dennis Frederick, judge of the above-entitled
court, and is set for hearing on Monday, September 10, 1984, at
the hour of 9:00 a.m.
DATED the

^

/

day of August, 1984.

s^

^/<L:s^rc~
//f

LJ.

GORDON A. MADSEN
Attorney for Defendant
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1,

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certiiy that a copy of the foregoing Notice was mailed
to Aaron Alma Nelson, attorney for the

plaintiff, at his address,

1300 Continental Bank Building, Salt Lake City, Utah
postage prepaid, the

*^ 7

84101,

day of August, 1984,

GORDON A. MAD SEN
Attorney for Defendant

^ \
"^
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TWoiiiciimomw
AARON ALMA NELSON
BAYLE, HANSON, NELSON & CHIPMAN
Attorneys for Plaintiff
1300 Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: 364-3627

SHTLAf £CWMrv.UT*H
f

SET I I 6*3AH M

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
ROSEMARY WISCOMBE,
Plaintiff,

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

vs.
J. WILLIAM WISCOMBE,

Civil No. D79-2603
JUDGE J. DENNIS FREDERICK

Defendant.

Pursuant to Rule 3, Rules of Practice in the Third
Judicial District Court, I hereby certify that on the 10th day of
September, 19 84, Answers to Interrogatories were served by mail,
on:
Gordon A. Madsen
Attorney for Defendant
320 South Third East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
DATED this 10th day of September, 19 84.
BAYLE, HANSON, NELSON & CHIPMAN

*-<*, s*-

Attorneys for Plaintiff

-<£-
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FILED IN CLERKS OFFICE
Salt Lake County Utah

AARON ALMA NELSON
BAYLE, HANSON, NELSON & CHIPMAN
Attorneys for Plaintiff
13 00 Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 364-3627

Mi 19 1984
H Dixon \fit\6l

By

U

'dOlst.Ccjrt

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

& I'JtKV

,P^

ROSEMARY WISCOMBE,
JUDGMENT UPON ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE
Plaintiff,
vs.
J. WILLIAM WISCOMBE,
Defendant.

Civil No. D79-2603
JUDGE J. DENNIS FREDERICK

The order to show cause why Defendant should not be held in
contempt of Court for failure to pay to Plaintiff monthly payments
for property settlement and failure to execute and deliver to Plaintiff a mortgage or trust deed on the real property awarded to Defendant duly came before Commissioner Sandra Pueler on August 9, 1984,
at 3:00 p.m., pursuant to Rule 8 of the rules of this Court.

Plain-

tiff appeared through her attorney, Aaron Alma Nelson, and Defendant
appeared through his attorney, Gordon A. Madsen.

After hearing the

evidence and arguments by the parties, Commissioner Pueler entered
her recommendations that Defendant be required to comply with the
terms of the original Decree of Divorce and that Plaintiff be
awarded judgment against Defendant for the amounts Defendant failed

Addendum 26

to pay to Plaintiff in property settlement under the Decree of
Divorce.

Commissioner Pueler further recommended that Defendant

execute and deliver to Plaintiff a mortgage or trust deed on the
real property awarded to Plaintiff, as required by the original
Divorce Decree.
The Order to Show Cause again came before this Court for
hearing on October 1, 1984, at 10:00 a.m., upon notice filed by
Defendant's attorney dated August 21, 1984.

This Court deter-

mined that Defendant did not provide notice to the Commissioner's
office and opposing counsel that the recommended Order is not
acceptable or that further order is desired within five days of
the entry of the Commissioner's recommendations, as required by
Rule 8(d) of the rules of this Court.

Defendant is therefore

deemed to have consented to entry of an Order in conformance v/ith
the Commissioner's recommendation, pursuant to said rule.
On the basis of the ruling of Commissioner Pueler and Rule 8
of the rules of this Court, it is hereby
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED:
1.

That Plaintiff is hereby awarded judgment against Defen-

dant for all unpaid property settlement payments under the Decree
of Divorce, presently in the amount of $8,411.00, together with
interest on each payment from the date payment was due at the
legal rate.
2.

That Defendant is hereby ordered to deliver to Plaintiff

a mortgage or trust deed on the real property awarded to Defendant
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at 1201 Sage, Evanston, Wyoming, in the amount of the first mortgage
on Plaintiff's house at 4612 Belmour Way, Salt Lake City, Utah, as
requiied by the original Decree of Divorce.
3.

That Plaintiff is hereby awarded judgment against Defendant

in thj amount of $

( S"Z),

as a reasonable attorney's fee,

together with costs incurred herein in the amount of $32.75.

DATED th

-4

day of

, 1984
BY THE #OURT:

APPROVED AS TO FORM:

CJ&rk

Bv

nS,

C<—i^c6(

^"YQiLcu/ex~

Deputy Cierk

SANDkA PUELER
DOMESTIC RELATIONS COMMISSIONER
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1. _

GORDON A.
ROBERT C.
Attorneys
320 South
Salt Lake
Telephone
1G

MADSEN
CUMMINGS
for Defendant
Third East
City, Utah 84111
322-1141

'S

11 1GQ4

^ 1f'lT'&v" ^ */f

s

* ^CLr*

D.pjtyCe.n.

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ROSEMARY WISC0M3E,
Plaintiff,
vs.

ORDER

J. WILLIAM WISCOMEE

Civil No. D-79-2603

Defendant.
The above-entitled matter came on for hearing on the
19th day of November, 1984, before the Honorable J. Dennis
Frederick, judge of the above-entitled court, on defendant's
Objection to Judgment.

Aaron Alma Nelson appeared for the

plaintiff and Gordon A. Madsen appeared for the defendant.

The

Court, having heard the arguments of counsel,
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that defendant's

Objection to Proposed Judgment Upon Order to Show Cause is denied,
DATED the

AJ)

day of November, 1984.
BY THE tfOURT:

AT
'IV

*7V'

im

JO

C >,:

Ifctf
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that two copies of the foregoing Brief of
Appellant was mailed to Aaron Alma Nelson, attorney for the
respondent, at his address, 1300 Continental Bank Building, Salt
Lake City, Utah

84101, postage prepaid, the 4th day of November,

1985.

Attorney for Appellant

